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Summary:
This paper reviews the tax system in Tanzania, and gives particular attention to the tax reform
proposals presented in the Report of the Presidential Commssion on Taxation. In considering
the effects of the "low-rate, broad-base" tax reform strategy that has been adopted, it is argued
that there are major shortcomings in the implementation of the tax reform. This particularly
relates to the continuous and widespread tax evasion, extensive tax exemptions and inefficient
tax administration. The discussion in this paper reinforces the arguments for improving the
quantitative analysis of revenue policy, and taking more specific and focused measures to
improve tax administration.
Sammendrag:
Dette notatet tar utgangspunkt i den pågående skattereformen i Tanzania. Sentrale elementer
i reformforslaget har ikke blitt implementert. Spesielt gjelder dette tiltak for å utvide
skatte basen. Betydningen av mer fokuserte tiltak for å forbedre skatteadministrasjonen, med
sikte på å begrense den omfattende skatteunndragelsen og utstrakte bruken av skattefritak, blir
drøftet.
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1 Introduction and overview1
Since the adoption of the World BanklIMF supported Economic Recovery
Program (ERP) in 1986, the GovernmentÒf Tanzaniahas undertaken various
policy reform measures, including trade and exchange rate reforms, banking and
financial sector reforms, and reforms in agricultural marketing. It has also
embarked up on a comprehensive tax reform process. While piecemeal reforms of
particular taxes have beengoing on since the late 1960s, the Government
appointed a "Commission of Enquiry into Public Revenues, Taxation and
Expenditure" in October 1989 to study and review the central and local
government tax systems and its administration, and make recommendations.2
In December 1991, the Tax Commission offered a proposal for reform of the
Tanzanian tax system. The proposal shares several features with reforms that have
taken place or are to be implemented in other countries since the mid-1980s
(Fjeldstad, 1995a). The Commission recommended reducing the marginal tax rates
on personal and company income, to broadening the tax base by eliminating
exemptions and to introduce more efficient enforcement mechanisms, to introduce
measures to simplify the tax system, and, more controversial, to introduce a value-
added tax.3
There are several reasons why the Tanzanian case is worth studying. First, both
internal and external economic and political conditions have changed significantly
during the last decade, with huge effects on both public revenue and expenditure
structures (Mans, 1994, World Bank, 1994a). Second, the Economic Recovery
Programme (ERP) provides a broad outline of politics, including measures to
increase revenue and reduce the growth of public expenditures. Fiscal reforms
have, thus, come to the heart of the ongoing economic and political reforms (URT,
1991a; World Bank, 1994a and 1995b). Third, extensive tax evasion and
avoidance, reflecting poor compliance and poor administrative capacity as well as
other institutional constraints, have important impacts on the design and
implementation of tax reforms (Bird, 1992; Tanzi, 1991; and Tanzi and Shome,
1993). Because Tanzania has much in common in these respects with other 10w
This paper is based on a study commissioned by the Macro Group in Dar es Salaam, whose
members are drawn from the National Planning Commission, Ministry of Finance, Bureau of
Statistics and Bank of Tanzania. I have benefited greatly from discussions with members of the
Macro Group and I wish to express my heartfelt thanks for their hospitality and support. I
would also like to thank Arild Angelsen, IbrahIm Lipumba, Hildegunn Nordås and Ussif Rashid
Sumaila for many helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and to the Norwegian
Agency for Development Co-operation (NORAD) and the Norwegian Research Council for
financial support. Opinions are entirely mine.
2 Here I refer to this as the Tax Commission or the Commission (URT, 1991a).
3 The proposal of introducing a value-added tax in Tanzania, is discussed in Fjeldstad (1995b).
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income countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, its experiences may provide
valuable information about the appropriate design and reform of tax systems.
This paper begins by reviewing the background to the 1991 tax reform proposal,
and considers in section 2 two types of factors of particular relevance in this
respect: the structure of taxation, and the more fundamental characteristics of the
Tanzanian economy which may in part exp1ain the present structure of taxation.
The focus in section 3 is on the objectives and features of the 1991 tax reform
proposals. In considering the effects ofthe adopted "low-rate, broad-base" strategy,
I argue that there have been major shortcomings in the measures recommended to
widen the tax base. Section 4 proceeds by asking which factors could explain the
significant drop in tax revenues experienced after the implementation of reform
proposals in fiscal year (FY) 1992/93. I put forwardand discuss four factors which
are of particular importance in this respect: (i) reduced tax rates; (ii) extensive tax
exemptions; (iii) widespread tax evasion; and (iv) inefficient tax administration.
The aim of section 5 is to discuss the revenue productivity of the Tanzanian tax
system in relation to the Governments objective of fiscal self-reliance. I question
the realism of this objective when only focusing on the revenue side of the budget,
and argue that there are grounds to believe that a major budgetary problem in
Tanzania is the leve! of public expenditures. Finally, in section 6 I evaluate some
of the policy implications, particularly for the present tax system.
2 The tax system in Tanzania
The tax system found in any country and the potential changes that may be made
in the system inevitably reflects the economic structure of that country. Before
engaging in a detailed analysis of tax policy it is therefore important to consider
some fundamental characteristics of the Tanzanian economy which may in part
explain the present structure of taxation. In this section I put forward and discuss
four factors which are of particular importance in this respect:
1. Income per capita and income distribution.
2. The agriculture sector.
3. The formal and informal sectors.
4. The public sector.
2.1 Background for fax reform
1. Incame per capita and incame distribution.
Tanzania is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a population of roughly
28 milion, growing at 3 percent per year, and covering the eight largest land area
(945,000 square km) in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 1995b). Per capita
income was estimated to USD 90 in 1993, and average annual GNP growth per
capita during the period 1980-1993 was estimated to 0.1 percent (World Bank,
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1995a).4 Poverty is widespread with about half the population below the poverty
line (Ferreira, 1993).5 Income distribution is distorted. In 1991, the highest 10
percent fractile of persons, ranke d by per capita expenditures, received more than
45 percent of national income, and the lowest 20 percent fractile received roughly
2.5 percent (Mans, 1994). Thus, the scope for extensive reliance on personal
income taxation is limited. While, in principle, the rich could have paid a high
level of tax . on income, the necessary administrative apparatus required for
enforcement and collection does probably not exist, and if it did, would probably
not be cost efficient. Moreover, economic distortions are likely to arise if very
high income tax rates were imposed.
2. The agriculture sector.
The majority of the population is engaged inagriculture, largely subsistence
agriculture. Nearly 80 percent of the total population live in rural areas (1992), and
85 percent of the labour force is engaged in agriculture (1990-92).6 Agriculture
accounts for about 50 percent of GDP (1991-93),1 with nearly four fifths of the
activity in the small holder sector. It also accounts for nearly 70 percent of total
export earnings (1992 and 1993). Transactions within this sector are, however,
generally hard to observe and therefore hard to tax (Newbery, 1987:202). The
probably only easy way to tax small-scale farmers is through export taxes, and
substantial revenue used to accrue to the government by way of taxes on export
produce. In 1976/77, export taxes contributed nearly 16 percent of total tax
revenue. In 1979/80 this percentage was about 6 percent. This reduction was
mainly caused by poor export performance and heavy disincentives to export
production resulting from overvalued exchange rates, weak and expensive
marketing and transport systems.8 Later, in order to encourage exports, it was
decided to reduce the number of export goods subject to taxes. Finally, in 1985/86,
all export taxes were removed.
4 In Human Development Report 1995 (UNDP, 1995) real GDP per capita in 1992 is estimated
to USD 620 (PPP).
5 The poverty and hard core poverty lines have recently been estimated at TSh 46,173 and TSh
31,000 respectively (Ferreira, 1993). Poverty is particular pervasive in rural areas. 59 percent
of vilage households are poor, and 90 percent of hardcore poverty is in rural areas (Mans,
1994:408). See World Bank (1990) for a discussion of measures and characteristics of poverty.
6 Figures from World Bank (1995a). See World Bank (1994b) for a more detailed presentation
of the agricultural sector in Tanzania.
7 The figure is in current prices (Bank of Tanzania, 1993:14), and varies slightly with other
sources. According to the World Development Report 1995, agriculture contributed to 56
percent of GDP in 1993 (World Bank, 1995a).
See Havnevik et aL. (1988), and URT (1991a:para 3.8 ).
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3. The formal and informal sectors.
There is a re1atively small "formal" sector in Tanzania. In the non-agricultural
sectors,which accounts for the other half of GDP, the formal sector employs only
a minor part of the labour force. Recent estimates suggest that recorded non-
agricultural employment is 5 to 6 percent of the adult population (World Bank,
1992:2). Within the formal sector, the large st single employer is the Government.
As in the case of small-scale and subsistence farming, it is, in general, difficult to
tax small retail establishments, self-employed businessmen, professionals and petty
traders (Musgrave, 1987 and 1990). At least four major problems arise in taxing
these so-called hard-to-tax groups. First, the need to deal with a large number of
taxpayers may result in heavy administrative costs, which may ultimately be larger
than the amounts of revenue actually collected (Musgrave, 1990:299). Second,
administration is difficult because many of these taxpayers, especially the farmers
and the small businesses, may find it burdensome to maintain books of account.
Third, even if such books are kept, the tax officials have little evidence by which
to judge their accuracy. Finally, taxation may result in taxpayers withdrawing from
the market, for instance, farmers may go into subsistence farming when their
output are taxed (Hyden, 1980).
These problems are particularly severe in Tanzania because the informal sector
appears to have been growing particularly rapidly. According to Bagachwa and
Naho (1995) the second economy in Tanzania "seem to have grown from a low
level of less than 10% of offcial GDP during the late 1960s to a sizeable
proportion of over 20% after the mid-1980s". 9 U nrecorded activities in areas such
as construction, real estate, rep air workshops, transport, etc. generate sizeable
incomes, but because of administrative difficulties these income sources remain
untapped for tax purposes. According to Ferreira (1993), income from informal
sector business and agricultural activities contributed 44 and 34 percent of total
income of urban households, respectively. In Dar es Salaam the respective figures
were 83 and 1 percent.
4. The public sector.
The public sector in Tanzania is large and accounts for the main part of non-
agricultural formal sector activity. Employees of government and parastatals
account for at least 75 percent of total number of employees in the formal sector.
Of these nearly one third are employed in parastatals (World Bank, 1992). In
1993, the civil service (exclusive parastatal employees) consisted of nearly 350,000
9 These figures should be considered with caution. In an earlier study, Bagachwa and Naho
(1993:19) estimate the second economy to more than 40 percent of GDP. The discrepancy
between these studies reflect the uncertainty related to such estimates (see also Maliyamkono
and Bagachwa, 1990). The definition of the "second economy" used by Bagachwa and Naho
(1993 and 1995) is dose to that of the "underground" economy us ed by, e.g., Tanzi (1983).
Thomas (1992) provides a thorough discussion of definitions and characteristics of informal
economic activity.
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civil servants (World Bank, 1994a). The entire structure of wages for civil servants
is fixed unilaterally by the Government. During the 1970s and 1980s, there has
been a severe erosion in the real wages and salaries of civil servants. Average
salaries in the late 1980s,for examp1e, provided only one-fifth the purchasing
power of the 1970s. The Government also controls the wages of parastatal
employees, although the electric power authority has introduced a performance-
based pay scheme. Other profitable parastatals are also proposing to increase
wages substantially.
Civil servants also receive monetary allowances of, on average, 35 percent of
wage remuneration. Allowances differ significantly between the different
categories of civil servants. The upper ranks of the civil service, for instance, also
enjoys several in kind benefits, such as free housing, telephone, and transport. The
abundance of allowances has contributed to a remuneration structure that is non-
transparent and inequitable (World Bank, 1994a:v). According to Mans
(1994:378), the average civil servants package of wages and monetary allowances
covers only about 40 percent of the expenses of a typical household.
With somewhere close to 350 parastatals, distributed across all sectors of the
economy, Tanzania has one of the largest parastatal sector in Sub-Saharan
Africa.1O About 275 of these are commercial parastatals that play a dominant,
of ten monopolistic, role in many key sectors. Manufacturing parastatals account
for about 60 percent of total value added in the sector and they have monopolies
in several major segments of the industrial sector, e.g., production of beer,
cigarettes, steel and electric cables. The state also enjoys a dominant position in
the services sector, including the hotel sector (Mans, 1994:378-380).
In general, the financial performance of the parastatals is poor. According to the
government auditor of parastatal accounts (Tanzania Audit Corporation), net losses
after taxes before interest payments for commercial parastatals were about 8
percent of ODP in fiscal 1989 (Mans, 1994:380). Recent studies show that more
than 50 percent of parastatals are inviable and require subsidies to continue
operating. The chronic loss-makers avoid paying taxes and pension funds
contributions, as well as the counterpart fund share of the commodity import
support funds they receive.
Restructuring of parastatals is commenced as a part of the economic recovery
programme (ERP). By mid 1994 there had been 20 divestitures and a further 22
10 Hyden (1983:96) argues that the expansion of the parastatal sector since independence can be
explained with reference to two interrelated factors: First, by astrong desire by the government
to establish control of the national economy by buying out foreign capital, and, second, by the
absence of strong pressures from an indigenous capitalist dass for expansion of the private
sector. A combination of these factors paved the way for an almost inordinate expansion of
parastatals in Tanzania, as well as in several other African countries.
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enterprises had been liquidated or closed, while 117 parastatals were in the initial
stages of preparing their restructuring plans (URT, 1994: 13-14). However, several
factors impede the pace of the privatization. The Government is still reluctant to
sell the few profitable parastatals. Further, in the absence ofa social safety net for
workers who would be released, the Government is reluctant to undertake the
more extensive liquidations that may be inevitab1e (Mans, 1994:381). This is also
the case with the civil service retrenchment programme initiated in 1992/93, where
a keyelement was the retrenchment of 50,000 civil servants over a three year
period. Under this programme, while some categories of civil servants identified
to be redundant are being retrenched, other categories, especially personneI in
education, health and security, which account for almost 50 percent of the civil
service, continue to be hired (World Bank, 1994a:v). In the short term, one may
expect that the retrenchment of civil servants and privatisation of parastatals wil
imply some negative budgetary impacts on tax revenue.
2.2 The structure of the tax system
The tax structure and its changes over the last 15 years are shown in Table 2.1
and 2.2. The composition of taxes has fluctuated much since fiscal year (FY)
1989/90. In FY 1991/92, for instance, there was a considerable drop in direct tax
revenues (on income and wealth), mainly caused by reduced revenues from
company taxes. In FY 1992/93 there was a significant drop in revenues from
indirect taxes, on both domestic goods and services and international transactions,
partly caused by reduced tax rates introduced as part of the ongoing tax reforms
(see section 4.1).
It is conventional to distinguish direct from indirect taxation. The Concise Oxford
Dictionary of Current English (Sykes, 1984) defines an indirect tax as one "paid
by consumer in form of increased price for taxed goods". The dictionar defines
a direct tax as one "levied on persons who bears the ultimate burden of tax, e.g.
income tax, but not value added (tax) " . In a world in which the incidence of
taxation is an issue of complexity (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; and Mclure, 1990),
such definitions are difficult to sustain. In general, the distinction between direct
and indirect taxes reflects at least three different aspects of tax structures (Kay,
1990): (1) The choice between taxes on income and taxes on consumption; (2) the
choice between taxes on commodities and taxes on individuals; and (3) the choice
between a source of origin and a destination basis for taxation. Without
elaborating these distinctions any further, I here follow the categorization of taxes
used by the Tanzanian Treasury.
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Indirect taxes.
Taxes on goods and services, inc1uding sales and excise taxes on imports, are the
largest single source of tax revenues in Tanzania, accounting for about 55 percent
of total tax revenue and more than 11 percent of GDPin 1991/92, and about 40
percent and almost 4 percent in 1992/93, respectively. In the two last fiscal years
the percentages have been somewhat higher than 40 percent and 4 percent,
respectively (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). Sales and excise taxes are lumpe d together
in the tables, both for comparability over time and because the introduction of the
widespread excise system in 1989 was more a change in form than in reality (see
section 3.1). In effect, all that happened was that goods subject to sales tax rates
of 50 percent or more became subjected to excise taxes at similar leveIs. Sales and
excise taxes are, at present, for the most part, levied on the same narrow base of
manufactured products.
The structure of excise duty rates, prior to the 1992/93 budget announcement, was
quite complex. Both ad valarem rates (10, 20, 25, 35, 50, 60, 80 and 85 percent)
and specific rates as well as composite rates for some items were levied. The base
of excise duty was very wide with coverage extending to several hundre d items,
with the major revenue coming from duties on the "traditional" excise products -
beer, cigarettes, spirits, soft drinks and petroleum. In the 1992/93 budget, all ad
valorem rates barring 20 percent were abolished, and commodities which were
being charged less than 20 percent were exempted from excise. The base was
further narrowed by removing excise duties on locally produced goods such as
sugar, soap, textiles, matches etc..
The rate structure of sales tax has also gone through major changes since 1991.
Both the number and the magnitude of sales tax rates have been reduced (see
section 3.3). Currently, the rates on scheduled articles (both domestically produced
and imported) are: zero rate (for some raw materials and capital goods), 20, 30
and 40 percent, the latter being charged on "luxury" items. The sales tax on beer,
cigarettes, petroleum, soft drinks, and spirits also contributes to a considerable part
of these revenues. Services (catering services in designated hotels and restaurants,
telephone and electricity) are charged at 5, 10 and 15 percent.
While the main source of tax revenue continues to be taxes on goods and services,
the share of taxes collected at the border first fell in the early 1980s and then rose
substantially in the latter half of the decade (Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1), reflecting
both increased tax rates and the expansion of imports accompanying the early
phase of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). The abolition of export taxes
in 1985/86 (included in "other taxes on international transactions") was more than
compensated for by the considerable growth of sales and excise taxes levied on
imports. In fact, all of the growth in sales and excise taxes over this period is
accounted for by taxes on imports. In 1992/93, however, there was a significant
drop in revenues from taxes on international transactions, partly due to reduced
rates. This was also the case for indirect taxes on domestic goods and services (see
9
section 4). During FY 1993/94 and 1994/95 tax revenues from these bases have
stayed almost at the 1992/93 level relative to total tax revenues and GDP.
Direct taxes.
The following facts emerge from Tables 2.1 and 2.2:
- By far the biggest source of income tax revenue is the company income tax.
Two thirds of total income tax revenue in fiscal 1991/92 came from tax on
private companies and parastatals.
- Most personal income taxes are collected from PA YE (pay-as-you-earn).l1 The
importance of this source of revenue has, however, dec1ined over the last
decade - from 31 percent of total income tax revenues in 1984/85, to
approximately 17 percent in 1991/92. The relative decline of P A YE reflects
equity considerations in the face of declining real earnings. For example,
average salaries of civil servants in the late 1980s provided only one- fifth the
purchasing power of the 1970s (see section 2.1). Since personal income tax
bands are not indexed, the tax rates were reduced each year in the late 1980s
(Basu and Morrissey, 1993:17).
- Taxes on wealth (land rent and estate tax) are not important sources of revenue
any further.
- Since 1992/93, income taxes have increased their relative importance and now
constitutes approximately the same share of total tax revenue (about 25
percent), and GDP (above 3 percent), as taxes on international transactions.
Equally important, but not obvious from Table 2.1, is the importance of the public
sector as a source of direct tax revenues. Approximately one third of direct tax
revenues (taxes on income and wealth) came from taxes on parastatal profits in
the early 1990s. Similarly, public sector employees (government and parastatals)
accounted for nearly 75 percent ofthe P A YE tax base, and government employees
alone contributed to nearly half of total P A YE collections.
li Pay-as-you-earn (PA YE) is a "third pary" technique, which charge a third party, usually the
employer, with the tasks of deducting the tax from the payment (wages and salaries) made to
the taxpayer (employee), and remitting the proceeds to the government (Bird, 1983). Ideally,
the tax withheld should equal the tax due (Bird, 1992:101). Experience indicates that tax
evasion is minimized whenever there is withholding at source (Tanzi and Shome, 1993:816).
In most low income countries the personal income tax system encompasses only a relatively
small part of the potential tax base, in general, the public and parastatal sectors employees
where withholding systems may function (Bird, 1992).
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Figure 2.1
Structure of central government taxation, 1979-95
(in percent of total taxes)
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Sources: See table 2.1
To sum up, Tanzania's tax base by the mid 1990s appears to rest on three sources.
The first is the "traditional" excise and sales tax base of the so-called "demerit
goods", i.e. beer, tobacco, spirits and so on. The sec 
on d source is taxes on imports,
particularly consumer goods imports, and the third is taxes on company (inc1uding
parastatal) profits and civil servant salaries. Since the economic recovery
programme is focused very much on adjustments in both trade policy (e.g.,
through reduction in tariffs), and in the size and scope of public sector activity
(e.g., through retrenchment of civil servants), these tax sources are rather
precarious. It is therefore important to restructure the revenue system both to
accommodate these adjustments as well as to cope more adequately with the
severe underlying fiscal imbalances (see section 5).
3 Tax reforms in Tanzania
The tax reform initiatives in Tanzania may partly be considered as a response to
the threatening of a major fiscal crisis. This is reflected in the fact that most of the
proposed and implemented tax reforms in Tanzania have been guided by the need
to increase revenues. Before discussing the Tax Commission's proposals in more
detail, I wil brie fly summarize the major issues dealt with in previous tax reforms
in Tanzania.
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3.1 A brief history of tax reforms in Tanzania
Substantial efforts have already been made to improve taxation in Tanzania. Since
1969 there has been several tax reforms which have included (Osoro, 1992a:413):
- Introduction of sales tax in 1969.
- New income tax legislation in 1973.
- Amendment of the existing tax legislation to revise the tax bases and rates.
- Abolition of some excise duty in 1979 and export duty in 1985/86.
- Re-introduction of previously abolished excise duty in 1989.
In recognition of the continued poor functioning of the tax system and the need
to look at the tax system as a whole, the Government appointed a Tax
Commission in October 1989. The Commission's primar task was to study and
review the central and local government tax system and its administration, and
make recommendations to the government. Specifically, it was to recommend
changes to the existing tax system to:
- widen the tax base;
- enhance revenue collections; and
- promote greater efficiency of production in the economy.
The Commission's report was presented to the Government in December 1991
(URT, 1991a).
3.2 The Tax Commission's recommendations
An important goal established by the Tax Commission was to increase the degree
of Tanzania' s "fiscal self-reliance" in terms of achieving a surplus in the recurrent
budget instead of the significant deficit of recent year (URT, 1991a:para
2.19)12.The Commission's principal proposals for tax structure reform can be
summarized to:
Direct taxes
- Broaden the tax base by taxing fringe benefits and improving compliance, aided
by more effective enforcement.
- Further reduce the tax rates on individual and company income, but apply these
rates on a broadened base.
- Make some adjustments for the effects of inflation.
12 See also section 5.
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Indirect taxes
- Replace the current multiple-rate structure of sales and excise taxes by a value-
added-tax (V AT) and a limited number of excises on traditional excisable goods
and luxury items.
- Simplify the customs duties by reducing the number of rates, and reducing
exemptions from both customs and sales taxes.
This "low-rate, broad-base" strategy was considered to be more consistent in
practice with both efficient re source allocation and equity than the "high-rate,
narrow-base" pattern that had dominated the Tanzanian tax system in the past
(World Bank, 1992). These proposals also shared many features with the tax
refotmsin other countries since the 1986 US tax reform (Fjeldstad, 1995a). In this
section I discuss in more detail some of the Commission's proposals:
Personal incame taxes
The essential problem with the personal income tax in Tanzania is the low tax
base, inherently because so many people are on low incomes.13 In addition, little
income is actually taxed (Basu and Morrissey, 1993:21). Probab1y the most
important single recommendation made with respect to personal income tax was
to bring "fringe-benefits" into the tax base (URT, 1991a:para. 6.42). The current
remuneration system for civil servants consists of a meagre basic salary
supplemented by a host of non-taxable monetary and non-monetary allowances.
A very large fraction of the monetary compensation of many civil servants takes
the form of non-taxable allowances (see section 2.1). The ratio of monetary
allowance to salary for the 172 employees in top scale (SS2) in November 1991
was 530 percent. The average ratio for all ranges was 35 percent, indicating that
an extra 35 percent of their monthly salary was given in the form of non-taxable
monetary allowances. These figures would probably be even more striking if it
was possible to obtain data on the many in-kind benefits received by senior
officials and politicians. This practice has severely eroded the tax base, especially
since the practice within the public sector has been adopted by the private sector.
The Tax Commission strongly recommended to incorporate into the personal
income tax base all monetary allowances and fringe benefits (e.g.; responsibility
allowance, house and transport allowances, etc.), and in kind personal benefits
(e.g. car, home utility services). This recommendation is, however, inextricably
connected with the reform of civil service pay schedules.
The Commission recommended the number of tax bands to be limited to about
seven, the maximum marginal tax rate being 40 percent and the minimum rate
should be set at 5 percent (applying to those earning above the minimum wage).
At the appropriate time, consideration should be given toreducing the maximum
13 Poverty is widespread with about half the population below the poverty line (see section 2.1).
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40 percent rate (URT, 1991a:executive summar para 15). Further, all employees
within the P A YE system should be required to file a tax return (URT, 1991 a: para
6.62). However, since the Income Tax Department, at present, is not able to deal
adequately with the taxpayers who already fie, it would be difficult to implement
this recommendation unless the necessary administrative measures are taken first.
What is required is probably more effective use by the Tax Authority of the
information already available from the PA YE system and other sources.14
With respect to non-PAYE taxpayers, mainly the self-employed, the Commission
recommended the use of "standard assessments" for those with turnover less than
Tsh 10 milion (URT, 1991a:para 6.79). Many developing countries have found
this approach to be useful in dealing with the so-called "hard-to-tax" group, but
experience suggests that considerable care is needed in developing and app1ying
such "standard" (minimum) assessments.15 Nonetheless, despite the difficulties,
it seems essential that the Government begins to take some effective action to
extend the reach of the tax system into the informal sector, and one way of doing
so may be through a "standard assessment" system.
The Commission is c1ear that no additional revenue is to be expected from this
source as a whole (URT, 1991a:executive summary, para 11). Most of the
recommendations with respect to direct taxes would in fact appear to reduce
revenue, with the major exception of the recommendation to tax fringe benefits
and withdraw the tax exemptions given for housing allowances, responsibilty
allowances and diligence awards. It appears that losses can be avoided only if tax
administration is substantially improved. There is certainly considerable room for
such improvement, but experience suggests that there are much uncertainty
attached to revenues from this source (World Bank, 1992). This is also reflected
in the fact that no attempt has been made by the Commission to attach any
revenue figures to these recommendations. In this respect, the 1992/93 budget
estimates, which depended parlyon increases in direct tax revenues from
improved administration, was misleading (see section 4).
Company incame taxes
Some changes to company taxes were recommended by the Commssion, notably
to encourage payment of dividends and allow for accelerated depreciation in
situations with high levels of inflation. The official rate of inflation in Tanzania
has averaged around 22 percent annually in recent years.16 Such high rates of
14 Recently, Tanzania Revenue Authority was established (the Act was signed on August 8 1995).
The two existing tax departments, the Department of Income Tax and the Customs and Sales
Tax Department, wil, after a transitionary period, be shut down and their responsibiltes
transfered to the new authority.
15 See, e.g., Musgrave (1990) and Bird (1992).
16 The inflation rate rose to 35 percent in FY 1994/95 (URT, Budget frame projections).
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inflation causes a reduction of real tax revenue because of lags in tax collection,
and because it forms the base of the inflation tax (see Tanzi, 1987:238)Y They
also distort the efficiency and equity of the explicit tax system (Lindbeck,
1990:67). In the case of company taxation, inflation may result in severe and
undesirable distortions in investment incentives, company accounting, and tax
liability. Recognizing this problem, the Tax Commission recommended that when
inflation is high (in double digits), accelerated depreciation (up to 100 percent)
should be given on machinery and equipment (URT, 1991a:para 7.48). However,
no mention is made of the distortion resulting from the deduction of nominal
interest (including the inflation component), nor is any quantitative analysis of the
revenue implications of this recommendation presented. The issues of inflation and
investment incentives raised above are, however, complex and controversial.
Indirect taxes
Most of the Commission's recommendations that can be quantified with respect
to the more important indirect taxes, wil most likely imply a loss of tax revenues:
- Excises should be confined to a narrow range of goods such as a1coholic
drinks, beverages, soft drinks, tobacco and petroleum, cosmetics, jewellery, etc.
Textiles would cease to be liable to excise duty, so should duties on sugar and
soap.
- Customs duty should besimplified to three rates: zero for capital and essential
goods; 20 or 25 percent for intermediate inputs; and 30 or 40 percent for
consumer goods.
- Export-duties should not be re-imposed for the foreseeable future.
The Commission is, however, rather vague as to the revenue implications of its
indirect tax proposals (URT, 1991a:para. 24.20), apparently because of the
uncertainty related to the final rate structure and the extent to which exemptions
would be eliminated. The replacement of the present sales tax by a value-added-
tax (V AT) is the Tax Commission's central recommendation in this area (URT,
1991a:para. 12.5, para 12.19 and para 12.36). It seems c1ear that the Tax
Commission envisages the V AT, and its potential future expansions, as an
essential part of Tanzania's future revenue system. The tax base would initially be
similar to the present sales tax, with some additional services being subject to
taxation at the 10 percent rate. There would be no exemption for small firms.18
At the same time, many of the existing excise taxes, notably on textiles, would be
abolished (URT, 1991a:para. 13.15) - as has now been done for locally produced
17 This is the well-known Olivera- Tanzi effect. In this paper I do not discuss the inflation tax,
which is somewhat different from other taxes in that it is not levied formally, and revenue can
also be zero or even negative (if prices are falling). For a few countries with persistent inflation
this tax is likely to be a significant source of revenue (Bleaney et aL., 1995:891).
18 Introduction of a VAT in Tanzania is discussed in more detail in Fjeldstad (1995b).
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textiles. In addition, the Commission recommended that the existing
"discretionary" exemptions from sales and excise taxes, like those on customs
duties, should be abolished (URT, 1991a:para. 12.24).
3.3 Implementation of the Tax Commission's recommendations
Consistent with the recommendations of the Tax Commission, various taxes were
simplified, and a number of tax rates were lowered in the FY 1992/93 budget. It
was expected that these measures would yield additional revenue that would more
than offset the anticipated dec1ine in revenue due to the tax rate reductions (World
Bank, 1994a). In brief, the Government has implemented (or intend to implement)
the following tax reforms:19
- All types of tax and duty exemptions granted to the central and local
governments, religious institutions (exemptions should be limited to "goods" for
pure religious rituals), parastatals, political parties and their affiliates were
abolished in June 1992.
- The personal income tax rates were reduced to a range of 5 to 30 percent from
the range of 7.5 to 40 percent in July 1992.
- The corporate income tax rates for resident companies were reduced to 35
percent from 45, and for non-resident companies from 50 to 40 percent in
J anuary 1993.
- The rate structure of customs duty were changed in FY 1992/93 from the
existing rates (in percent) O, 20, 30, 40 and 60 to O, 10, 20 and 30. A new
customs classification system was also introduced.
- A customs duty of 20 percent for lubricants is intended to be introduced.
- All excise tax rates above 20 percent were lowered to that level, and locally
produced sugar, soap, textiles and other commodities were exempted from
excises in FY 1992/93. Further, all taxes on raw materials for use by local
industries are to be remitted i.e. free of customs duties, sales tax and excise
duties. Certain taxes - particularly sales tax and excise duties - on certain food
items, e.g,. sugar, wheat flour, etc., are to be removed.
- The land rent is to be increased by 20 percent after a revaluation of all land
properties.
- The road toll was increased from TSh 7 to TSh 10 per litre of diesel or petrol.
- The airport services tax of USD 20 is extended to be charged for all departures
for external destinations for both resident and non-resident travellers.
- All taxpayers shall fie an income tax return.
There are, however, major shortcomings in the implementation of the
recommended measures to widen the tax base. In fact, tax exemptions, far from
being eliminated, have increased. In September 1993, for example, less than 10
19 From Table II in United Republic of Tanzania (1992d).
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percent of import taxes payable under the preshipment inspection and tax
assessment programme had actually been paid (World Bank, 1994a:8).20
Exemptions for imported inputs which were enacted in the 1992/93 budget, were
therefore cancelled in 1993 because of severe difficulties with evasion and
avoidance. A major problem in this respect was to distinguish imported inputs
from imported goods.
The two major base broadening measures recommended by the Tax Commission,
i.e. the introduction of a V AT and to incorporate into the tax base all monetary
allowances and fringe benefits paid to formal sector employees, have yet to be
implemented. In the short run, it is also unrealistic to expect all taxpayers' to fie
an income tax return. The Government announced in the 1992 (June) Budget
Speechits intention to replace the existingsales tax with a V AT in January 1994.
To this day, however, little progress has been made in this area. Given the
substantial amount of lead time required to make a V AT fully operational, 18-24
months is of ten indicated, the earliest that it wil be possible to introduce the V AT
would be by mid-1997 (Fjeldstad, 1995b). This presupposes that intensified efforts
are made to launch the preparations immediately. Regarding the second major
base-broadening measure, the widening of the income tax base, little progress has
been made here, too (World Bank, 1994a:9).
Tanzania currently depends on indirect taxes for more than two thirds of its total
tax revenue (see Table 2.1 and 2.2). A successful implementation of the proposed
reforms wil probably not change this situation. On the whole, the changes in tax
mix that would result from implementing the Tax Commission's recommendations
- more revenues from indirect taxes, and relatively less direct tax revenues from
companies and more from individuals - all seem justifiable in Tanzania' spresent
circumstances. However, the delays in introducing a V AT ilustrate that
implementing the reforms is a more problematic task than indicated in the
Commission' s report.
4 The revenue shortfall in fiscal year 1992/93
During FY 1992/93 Tanzania experienced a significant fall in tax revenues
collected, both in relation to the budgeted figures and compared to the revenues
collected in the previous four year period. Figure 4.1 and 4.2 ilustrate the revenue
reduction in relation to GDP. Tax revenue in percent of GDP was reduced from
an annual average of more than 19 percent in the previous four year period, to
11.5 percent for FY 1992/93. The drop was mainly due to reduced tax revenue
from sales and excise taxes and import duties (Figure 4.2). Revenues from sales
and excise taxes fell to 3.6 percent in FY 1992/93 from an annual average of 10
percent of GDP in the previous four-year period.
20 This is discussed in more detail in section 4.1.
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Figure 4.1
Central government tax revenue and expenditure, 1985-95
(in percent of GDP)
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Figure 4.2
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4,1 F actors expZaining the drop in tax revenue
A combination of several factors explain the drop in tax revenue in FY 1992/93:
(a) immediate revenue losses owingto O) reduced tax rates not offset by a
sufficient reduction in (2) exemptions and the assumed reduction in (3) tax
evasion and avoidance; and
(b) the fact that the required strengthening of (4) tax administration to follow
up the tax reforms, has prove d difficult to imp1ement in the short term.
( 1) Reduced tax rates
During FY 1992/93 the following tax reductions were introduced (URT,
1992b:para 60-63):
- the personal income tax rates were reduced to a range of 5 to 30 percent from
the range of 7.5 to 40 percent;
- the corporate income tax rates were reduced for resident companies to 35
percent from 45, and for non-resident companies from 50 to 40 percent;
- the rate structure of customs duty was changed from the existing rates (in
percent) O, 20, 30, 40 and 60 to O, 10, 20 and 30;
- all excise tax rates above 20 percent were lowered to that level and locally
produced sugar, soap, textiles and other commodities were exempted from
excise; and
- all industrial raw materials were exempted from customs duty and sa1es tax.
These reforms were in line with the recommendations made by the Tax
Commission. It was considered that high tax rates in the past had adversely
affected productivity in the industries, which in turn led to increased operational
overheads and thus affected the competitiveness of locally produced commodities
vis a vis imports (URT, 1992b:para 57).
However, the major reductions in tax rates were implemented without de facto and
de jure broadening the tax base. In other words, only one element of the "10w-rate,
broad-base" strategy was followed (see section 3). I have not been able to provide
sufficient information for estimating the likely revenue loss due to the various tax
rate reductions, but I would expect the losses to be significant.21
(2) Tax exemptions
Much tax revenue has been lost through exemptions. For instance, the exemptions
granted on imports in 1989 constituted more than 96 percent of the potential taxes
on these imports (World Bank, 1992:29). According to URT 0992b:para 65), all
types of tax and duty exemptions granted to the central government, local
governments, political parties, and commercial enterprises were abolished from
21 Relevant information is, for instance, updated estimates on the elasticity and buoyancy of the
various taxes (see section 5.2).
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lune 1992. The Government expected revenue to increase by TSh 9,850 milion
due to the abolition of tax exemptions - a far too optimistic estimate. In addition,
the abolishment of these exemptions was only.partly implemented, and there are
stil many loopholes in the system.
(3) Tax evasion and avoidance
An endemic problem in the Tanzanian tax system is tax evasion, which appears
to be substantia1 and widespread (see section 5.4). The Government expected that
reduced rates wou1d contribute to reduced tax evasion (URT, 1992b:para 58).
However, it is not prudent to include such revenues in budgetary estimates,
particularly when there is litte reason to expect them to be realized.
A major problem in this respect isundervaluation of imported goods, which
applies to most own-funds imports. This is due to the fact that the importer has
access to foreign exchange without going through Bank of Tanzania records.
Central Bank funded imports (where the importer offers local currency in
exchange for foreign), as well as government and parastatal imports, are in general
easier to value, but are of ten exempted from taxation. Administrative constraints
and corruption at entry points increase the problem of undervaluation of imported
goods (Basu and Morrissey, 1993:22).
As a measure to reduce undervaluation, pre-shipment inspection (PSI) was
introduced in October 1992. On behalf of Bank of Tanzania, the Government
engaged the international companies, the Societé Generale de Surveilance (SGS),
Contecna and SSI, to inspect shipments to Tanzania from ports abroad.22 The PSI
programme involves inspection of imports to Tanzania in the country of
exportation, together with an assessment of the invoice price of the goods to be
imported. The purpose of the pre-shipment inspection is to ensure that the foreign
exchange outlay is commensurate with the price, quality and quantity of the goods
being imported.23 This measure must be considered as a short-run solution to the
basic problem of unsystematic and unreliable import valuation. In FY 1992/93 the
pre-shipment inspection companies were empowered to assess the amount of duty
payable at the time of inspection of imports. The intention was to reduce
bureaucracy and tax evasion. In the case of imports financed by Bank of
Tanzania' s foreign exchange, values are pre-checked at the point of shipment. The
minimum value of the shipments controlled was originally set to USD 5,000. By
February 1993 the pre-shipment inspection was extended to include "own funded"
imports over USD 5,000, to check that these imports were not under-valued.
22 The SGS does both pre-shipment control and tax assessment, the SSI makes pre-shipment
control, and Contechna assesses taxes.
23 Low (1995) provides a thorough discussion of the principles and practice of pre-shipment
services.
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However, the minimum value of the shipments controlled (USD 5,000), gave
importers incentive to split their shipments into units each valued below the
minimum limit, and thereby avoiding the control. There are also indications that
Zanzibar' s positionas a "freeport" to some extent has contributed to the avoidance
of import duties. Lower (or to some extent zero) rates on goods imported to
Zanzibar, led many importers to let their imports pass through Zanzibar, and then
"re-import" these goods to the mainland.24 Thus, by splitting the import
shipments into units valued below the USD 5,000 limit, and by importing via
Zanzibar, importers could effectively avoid taxes.
The revenue loss due to this kind of tax avoidance is difficult to assess in
quantitative terms. It is, however, reasonable to assume the loss to be significant
since the Government has considered it necessary to reduce the limit of pre-
shipment control to USD 2,500. Further, from January 1993, importers shall (in
principle) pay the difference in tariffs if imported goods enter the mainland
through Zanzibar.
(4) Tax administration
The 1992/93 budget estimates seem to depend to some extent on increases in
direct tax revenues from improved administrative measures in tax collection and
an extended tax base. According to the budgetary figures for 1992/93 Tsh 1,808
milion was to come from improved measures in tax collection (URT, 1992b:para
92). Taxes on income and wealth did increase as share of total tax revenue in FY
1992/93, due to reduced tax revenue from the other major tax sources (see Table
2.1). However, measured in percent of GDP income tax revenue was in fact
reduced compared to previous years.
The Government has taken several efforts to improve tax administration, and these
efforts may have contributed to some extent to a more efficient tax administration
during the last few years. The tax administration was also capable of collecting a
significantly higher amount of revenues (both in absolute and relative terms) in FY
1991/92 than in the preceding years (see Figure 4.2). In FY 1992/93 new tax rates
and new procedures for collecting tax revenues were introduced. Such measures
are usually difficult to implement in the short run without being supplemented by
a considerable strengthening of tax administration, otherwise the administration
may not manage to adopt the new system in a proper way. This factor probably
plays a major role in explaining the revenue shortfall in fiscal 1992/93, although
difficult to quantify.
24 The Dar es Salaam Express (14 January 1993), for instance, reports on the problem of importers
routing goods through Zanzibar, where tariffs are lower, e.g., 20 percent on TVs, compared to
40 percent in mainland Tanzania; 13 percent on textiles, compared to 20 percent, respectively.
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4.2 Lessons to be learned
The drop in tax revenues experienced in FY 1992/93 is not unique. Experience
from other developing countries shows that structural economic reforms often
entail short-run revenue 10sses(IMF, 1992). Empirical studies also show that fiscal
revenues, in general, tend to exhibit greater variability in less developed countries
than in developed market economies (Bleaney et aL., 1995).25 These differences
seem to reflect characteristics of the economy such as inflation, output variability
and openness.
A widespread objective of tax reforms in many low income countries has been to
shift from reliance on taxation of imports (and exports) to domestic taxation by
broadening the tax base - by introducing value-added taxation and extending the
individual income tax base. This objective has been pursued in line with trade
liberalization and the need to promote productive efficiency by reducing the level
of effective protection. Although (and more unusually) Tanzania's indirect tax
structure is dominated by taxes on domestic goods and services rather than on
imports, taxes on international transactions are not like1y to increase significantly
in the coming years, and may even gro w less than GDP (see section 5.4).
Broadening the domestic tax net to a larger commodity and income tax base
requires substantial strengthening of tax administration, which has proved to be
difficult to implement in the short term. Achieving increased revenues from such
a change assumes that the administration responsible for collecting domestic taxes
from an extended base are able to enforce these taxes. This is, in general, a much
more difficult tas k than collecting tariffs from a more limited customs space.
Hence, when tariff rates are reduced, without an accompanying removal of tax
exemptions and a strengthening of tax administration, revenue wil immediately
be reduced.
The reductions in tax rates during FY 1992/93 were premature, since they were
introduced without widening the tax base. This is probably the major explanatory
factor behind the shortfall of revenues. A tempting solution to this dilemma would
be to increase the tax rates again, for instance to the level before the reductions.
However, this may prove to be a shortsighted,solution. Frequent changes in tax
policy may contribute to increased uncertainty in the business community
(inc1uding potential foreign investors), and may call into question the credibility
25 A relevant question in this respect would be: Is there a positive correlation between revenue and
expenditure instability? It is not clear a priori that such a correlation is to be expected. Firstly,
if most of the variation in tax revenue is recognised by the Government to be caused by
temporary shocks, expenditure is not likely to follow actual revenue c10sely but to based on the
permanent component of revenue. Secondly, the Government wil probably assess the economic
and/or political costs of replacing lost revenues with alternative sources of funds compared to
the costs associated with expenditure cuts. Such an exercise could then produce different
outcomes, for instance, spending cuts, new and/or higher tax rates, increased borrowing, etc..
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of the Government' s policy. On the other hand, a stable tax policy environment
may encourage the business community to take a longer-term perspective in their
finance and investment decisìons. Tax changes should therefore be made after
transitional arrangements have been adequately considered, and they should be
presented as par of a long-term strategy. However, due to the decreasein tax
revenue collection, the Government decided to reimpose several tax rates and also
introduce new taxes on some items in FY 1993/94. It also resorted to bank
borrowing to finance its deficits, resulting in continued high inflation.
5 The revenue productivity of the Tanzanian tax system;
implications for fiscal self.reliance
The facts presented in sections 2, 3 and 4 are mirrored in the continuing diffcult
situation of public sector finances. During the five year period from 1987/88 to
1991/92, the annual deficit of the central Government averaged nearly 10 percent
of GDP (grants and commodity aid exempted, Table 2.2 and Figure 5.1).26 In
1991/92, the deficit fell to 2.9 percent of GDP reflecting an increase in foreign
funded capital expenditures and improvement in revenue collection. The deficit
increased to roughly 14 percent of GDP in FY 1992/93 and 10 percent in FY
1993/94, partly due to shortcomings in the attempt to reform the tax system. The
estimated deficit for FY 1994/95 is 5 percent of GDP, mainly reflecting reductions
in the expenditure budget. However, this estimate should be considered with
caution, and may appear to be too optimistic.
Figure 5.1
Central government current revenue and expenditure 1985-95
(in percent of GDP).
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26 See also Table B7 in URT (1992a).
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5.1 Tax revenue in percent of GDP
The level of tax revenue (T), expressed as a percentage of gross domestic product
(T/GDP), varies considerably among developing countries. In some countries, it
is below 10 percent and in a few it is above 30 percent. For the majority of
developing countries the level ranges between 15 percent and 25 percent.27
Compared to other low-income countries with a large share of agriculture in GDP,
tax revenue collection in Tanzania is high.28 The average tax ratio (total tax
revenue as a share of GDP) for the countries in Figure 5.2 is 10.6 percent.29 In
comparison, Tanzania's tax ratio was 18.1 percent in FY 1990/91, which is
equivalent to developing countries in which the agriculture sector's share of GDP
is in the area 25-30 percent, such as Gambia, Kenya and Sri Lanka. For instance,
in FY 1990/91 the tax ratio of Gambia was 25.8 percent, Kenya 17.8 percent and
Sri Lanka 19.1 percent (IMF, 1992).
Even if the Tanzanian GDP figures were underestimated by 50 percent as
indicated by a recent study (World Bank, 1995b), and GDP is not underestimated
in the other countries included in the figure (which is unlikely), revenue collection
in Tanzania would still be above average (12.3 percent).30 Underestimation of
GDP figures is probably also the case for most of the other countries listed in
Figure 5.2. The ranking of Tanzania in the table would therefore not necessarily
be affected by more "realistic" GDP figures.
Since 1992 Tanzania's tax ratio has dropped to alevel almost corresponding to the
other countries in the figure (11.5 percent in FY 1992/93; 13.6 percent and 13.3
percent in FY 1993/94 and 1994/95, respectively). However, one should take into
consideration that Tanzania has the highest share of agriculture to GDP (about 50
percent) of the selected countries.
27 For the OECD countries the average in the 1980-85 period was between 35% and 37% of GDP.
In a few countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) in 1985
it exceeded 45% of GDP (Tanzi, 1991).
28 The countries included in Figure 5.2 are selected on the basis that agriculture constitutes more
than 30 percent of GDP. In Tanzania, the share of agriculture in GDP is about 50 percent.
29 This average figure should be considered with caution and only be seen as an indication of the
level of tax revenue to GDP ratio, since the reference year varies among the countries.
30 Due to the existence of a sizeable sector of unrecorded domestic and international economic
transactions (see section 2.1), it is assumed that the GDP figures underestimate the size of the
real total economy in Tanzania. This is the background for the upward adjustment of the GDP
figures by 10-12 percent in 1995. This adjustment was, however, significantly lower than the
upward adjustment recommended by the IMF (personal communication).
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Figure 5.2
Tax revenue in percent of GDP in selected countries
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5.2 Measuring the tax system's revenue productivity
One criteria of an appropriate tax system is a high revenue productivity. The effect
on revenue has also been the principal issue for the Tanzanian tax reforms (Osoro,
1992b; and section 3). The common measures of such productivity are buoyancy
and elasticity (Osoro, 1992a:395).31 Two factors can cause gross tax revenue to
rise:
- the rate of tax and legislations can be changed to raise more revenue from the
same base; or
- the base on which the tax is imposed may grow.
The growth of tax revenues in response to GDP can therefore be decomposed into
two components:32
1. the automatic growth as the base on which the tax is charge d grows in response
to GDP; and
31 The method applied for estimating buoyancy and elasticity requires detailed knowledge of the
country in case, and is typically very crude - such as us ing dummy variables (for years in which
tax parameters are known to have changed) in a regress ion of tax revenues on time. See, e.g.,
Bleaney et aL. (1995:886) for a discussion of measurement problems in empirical analysis of
tax changes (and revenue instability) in developing countries.
32 Tax compliance is implicitly included in the first component. In addition, the composition of
growth in GDP matters.
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2. the growth resultng from changing the structure of taxes (e.g. the number or
1evel of tax rates, exemptions or the tax coverage ).
The combined effects of 1 and 2, i.e. the total revenue response, is termed tax
buoyancy. A buoyancy coefficient of, for example, 1.4 would imply that for every
1 percent increase in GDP, revenue from the tax had on average grown by 1.4
percent. The amount by which revenue from a tax, with a given structure, changes
in response to a change in its base, i.e. the effect of automatic growth alone (point
1 above), abstracting from discretionary changes, is termed the elasticity of a tax.
Thus, the elasticity of the tax system is how revenue from an unaltered tax
structure responds to economic growth. Hence, for an individual tax or the tax
system, the difference between the buoyancy (total response), and elasticity
(automatic response) can be attributed to structural changes. Accordingly, an
elasticity coefficient of 1.4 would imply that for every 1 percent increase in GDP,
tax revenue would have grown by 1.4 percent if the legislation and rate of tax had
remained unchanged (Osoro, 1992a:396). An elasticity of at least unit y is a
desirable property of a tax (system). Its revenue growth wil then keep pace with
that of GDP without frequent discretionary changes having to be made to its rates
and structure.
Elasticities of the total tax system and of major individual taxes are presented in
Table 5.1. First, the elasticity of the total system was less than unit y (0.80) over
the 1979-89 period, indicating that for every 1 percent increase in GDP, total tax
revenue would have grown by 0.80 percent in the 1980s. A buoyancy higher than
unit y (1.03) indicates that it was the tax reforms (see section 3.1) that generated
any overall revenue increases. Second, personal income tax had an elasticity of
0.81 and buoyancy of almost unit y (0.96). Consequently, increases in income tax
revenues were mainly generated by tax reforms. This was also the case with
company tax and PAYE (see section 2.2) which had elasticities of 0.90 and 0.68,
and buoyancies of 0.9 and 0.96, respectively. Third, sales tax had a buoyancy of
almost unit y (0.96) and an elasticity of 0.73, indicating that any revenue increases
were generated by tax reforms. Osoro (1992a:405) has estimated the sales tax-to-
base elasticity to 0.5,33 indicating the degree of revenue loss due to tax
exemptions, tax evasion and avoidance. Fourth, import duty had an elasticity of
0.97 and a tax buoyancy of 1.27, indicating that tariff changes were the principal
source of increased revenue. Further, a tax-to-base elasticity estimated to 0.9,
suggests a relatively efficient import tax collection during this period (Osoro,
1992a).34 Finally, regarding the buoyancy coefficient of 1.03 of the total system,
33 Tax-to-base elasticity measures the direct response of tax revenue to a change in the tax base.
The figure is average for the period 1979-89.
34 This situation seems to have changed dramatically in recent years. In September 1993, for
instance, less than 10 percent of import taxes payable under the pre-shipment inspection
programme had actually been paid. On several occasions, the Auditor General has highlighted
cases of negligence and dishonest practices by high placed civil servants (see section 5.4).
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this coefficient had probably been much lower without the frequent increases in
tax rates or devaluation episodes. A major effort seems therefore to be required
to sustain revenue yields in the face of the changing economic circumstances, let
alone to raise the share of taxation in the GDP.
Table 5.1
Tax buoyancy and elasticity , 1979-89
Total taxes 1.03 0.80
Income taxes 0.96 0.81
Company tax 0.90 0.90
PAYE 0.68 0.68
Sales tax 0.96 0.73
Import duty 1.27 0.97
Source: Osoro (1992a)
5.3 FiscaZ self-reZiance
The success of a country's fiscal policy may be assessed in terms of the extent to
which it can meet its expenditures out of its own revenues. Areasonable aim may
be to reduce to the point of elimination the current high dependency on foreign
aid for budgetar support. In the 1991/92 budget, for example, 39 percent of total
recurrent expenditures and more than 90 percent of the development (investment)
budget were provided by counterpar funds generated by balance of payments
support (Mans, 1994).35 Thus, at least three distinct aspects need to be considered
in relation to fiscal self-reliance:
(a) the level of tax revenues,
(b) the leve L of expenditures, and
(c) the difference between the two (c=a-b), or the deficit.
Further, fiscal self-reliance has two dimensions:
35 In recent years, offcial exports have financed on ly about one-thIrd of imports.
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(1) A static dimension, which has to do with the present relation between the
expenditure and revenue leveIs; and
(2) a dynamic dimension, which has to do with the relation between the
projected growth rates ofrevenues, expenditures and GDP.
The Government of Tanzania seems to focus on the latter, setting as a target to
achieve a growth rate of public expenditures not greater than that of real GDP.36
Jf the elasticity of expenditures is unit y (i.e. a one percent increase in GDP leads
to a one percent increase in expenditures), and the initial starting point is as far
from "static" fiscal self-reliance as is the case at present in Tanzania, increased
fiscal self-reliance would require an elasticity of revenue with respect to GDP
which is greater than unity. According to Osoro (1990), Tanzania has not had
unitary tax revenue elasticities in the last two decades. Alternatively, if the target
is to ensure that revenues and expenditures grow at approximately the same rate
in the future, a major effort must be made initially to lower expenditures, raise
revenues, or both, in order to reduce the present large fiscal imbalance and hence
the dependence of foreign aid.
5.4 The reaZism of the fiscaZ self-reZiance objective
The mismatch between revenues (exclusive grants) and expenditures is revealed
in Table 2.2 and Figure 5.1. In FY 1991/92 the Government maintained a tight
fiscal stance and as a res ult generated a fiscal surplus after grants. Results for FY
1992/93 show that the fiscal position has deteriorated severely (see section 4).
Current revenues fell from 23.5 percent of GDP in FY 1991/92 to 12.9 percent in
FY 1992/93, a fall of 10.6 percent in one year. The FY 1992/93 fiscal outcome
eroded the gains made in revenue enhancement during the economic reform period
after 1986, when revenues increased from 14.7 percent of GDP in FY 1985/86 to
23.5 percent in FY 1991/92. Over the same period expenditures have grown from
23.1 percent of GDP to 26.4 percent, respectively.
After the deficit in FY 1992/93 measures were adopted in the FY 1993/94 budget
that aimed to enhance revenue collection and to reduce the deficit back to more
sustainable levels (World Bank, 1994a:7). Data for FY 1993/94 and 1994/95
indicate that the revenue enhancement measures adopted in the 1993/94 budget
have succeeded in revers ing the dec1ine in revenue collection experienced the
preceding year, but not managed in regaining the pre-1992/93 level of tax revenue
relative to GDP. To finance its activities due to the decrease in revenue collection,
the Government resorted in FY 1993/94 to bank borrowing, from the Central Bank
36 In fact, recently the target of a growth rate of expenditures less than that of real GDP has been
discussed (personal communications).
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and from the commercial banks. This contributed to continuing high levels of
inflation and to a credit squeeze on the private sector (World Bank, 1994a:7).37
Reports by two of thepre-"shipment companies responsible for checking imports
through customs revealed losses of revenues to the State, in the shape of unpaid
customs dues, amounting to TSh 70 bilion (US D 134.5 milion) in FY 1993/94.38
The report stated that a few importers account for a large proportion of taxes
unpaid. The number of tax exemptions granted between January and October 1994
totalled 2,400 representing a loss of revenue for the Government of TSh 32 bilion
(US D 61.5 milion). The inquiry into this matter by the Auditor General highlights
cases of negligence and dishonest practices by high placed civil servants. In
September 1993, for example, less than 10 percent of import taxes payable under
the pre-shipment inspection/tax assessment programme had actually be en paid
(World Bank, 1994a).39 To control goods which are shipped via Zanzibar to
avoid taxes, the central Government has signe d an agreement with the Zanzibar
authorities to set up a inspection company in Zanzibar port.40 However, to date
this contract has yet to be translated into action (see section 4.1).
Recognizing the serious deterioration in the fiscal situation, in January 1994 the
Government adopted a package of revenue measures that included the reimposition
of a 10 percent customs duty on all imported raw materials for locally
manufactured goods, inclusion of the excise tax in the sales tax base of locally
produced goods, strict adherence to preshipment inspection, immediate withdrawal
of the concession allowing staggered payment of taxes combined with renewed
efforts to collect arrears that had resulted from this concession, strict monitoring
of the bonded warehouses, and a review of tax exemptions with a view to
decreasing their number. New taxes inc1uded a surtax on cars, an increase in the
transport withholding tax, an increase in the customs duty on all imported
commodities which are also produced locally, and an increase in a number of
customs fees and penalties. Some measures were also taken at the expenditure
side, but the emphasis was on the revenue side (World Bank, 1994a).
Taxation on international transactions wil probably still contribute significantly
to total revenue, ranging from 20-25 percent of total tax revenues in the three
foregoing fiscal years (see Table 2.1). In a period of economic transition import
37 From an analytical point of view, an interesting issue which arises here is that of Ricardian
equivalence. Because increased domestic borrowing implies a commitment to future tax
obligations, domestic borrowing may have output effects which are little different to changes
in government expenditure.
38 Indian Ocean Newsletter (1994a:5) and (1994c: 1).
39 Indian Ocean Newsletter (1994b:5) reports that the Government appears to collect little more
than 20-30 percent of all customs dues.
40 Indian Ocean Newsletter (1995: 1 and 6). The alternative of charging the same duties on imports
to Zanzibar as to the mainland, are also discussed (personal communication).
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duties may also buy time for the government to reconstruct the domestic tax
system. However, the level of import in the last two fiscal years, which has
resulted in a certain increase in theshare of taxes coming from imports, cannot be
relied upon as a permanent source of governmental revenue. In accordance with
less reliable import support funds and foreign aid, imports are likely to grow less
than GDP. Therefore, import taxes are likely to grow less than GDP as well. This
can be counterbalanced in the short run by reducing the extent of tax evasion and
exemptions. However, evidence from other developing countries suggests that it
becomes difficult to raise additional revenue when the tax revenue/GDP ratio has
reached about 20 percent. Therefore, and because a heavy tax burden may be
counterproductive and/or in conflict with the GATT agreement or any other
international commitments such as SADC and PT A, there is a need to carefully
review revenue measures.
Increased tax effort and careful review and substantial curtailment of expenditures
in almost all spheres of government activity are needed. An improved tax system,
inc1uding more efficient tax enforcement mechanisms, may contribute to a greater
degree of fiscal self-reliance. However, in the long run it is probably impossible
for a poor country like Tanzania to sustain the existing large level of the public
sector. In this perspective, the real budgetary problem in Tanzania is that the level
of public sector expenditures is well above the realistic capacity of the country to
finance them. It is therefore hard to imagine that serious progress can be made
without expenditure cuts.
6 Conclusions and policy proposals
The tax base in Tanzania tends to be narrow, excluding relatively important
sectors in the economy that are not fully monetized or incorporated in the formal
economy, such as large segments of agriculture, small-scale trade and services.
Moreover, tax evasion by large segments of the formal economy is particularly
widespread in the trade sector and among self-employed professionals and property
owners, and tax exemptions are stil common. Thus, if the tax net captures only
half of the economic activity (not an unreasonable estimate), a 20 percent tax ratio
translates into a 40 percent ratio on the average for those who pay taxes.
The widespread effort to reform the tax structure by reducing the tax rates and
abolishing tax exemptions is generally intended to be revenue neutral, if fully
implemented. Low import duties and excise rates on a broad base of goods rather
than high rates on a narrow base wil most likelyaIso reduce the incentives to
smuggle, given the substantial fixed costs associated with smuggling. However,
while reducing rates usually meet few obstacles, the removal of exemptions has
at times been delayed or only partially executed, due to resistance by vested
interests, leading to unanticipated shortfalls in revenues.
30
The Government should also consider innovative ways of widening the tax base
by taxing the informal sector. Several studies clearly indicates that the informal
sector has expanded during the last few years (URT,J991b; and Bagachwa and
Naho, 1993 and 1995). This expansionis partly caused by the deregulation and
liberalisation of the economic system in Tanzania, partly due to increased
competition which has given firms incentives to attempt to reduce costs by
evading labour and tax regulations. The increase in petty trading during the last
decade is partly explained by the fact that local businessmen transfer their trade
from the shops to the streets, thereby avoiding taxes. As a result, the tax base are
further undermined.
Experiences from other Sub-Saharan countries indicate three possible ways of
responding to this situation (IMF, 1992):
- By imposing a low (e.g., 2-3 percent) presumptive tax on all imports which can
be credited against income taxes for the registered taxpayers. In this way an
effective tax is imposed on the importers belonging to the informal sector, and
an incentive for registered taxpayers to file a tax return is created (e.g.,
implemented in Mauritania, Niger, and Togo).
- By imposing low excises on mass consumption commodities, thereby taxing the
informal sector indirectly on its consumption basket (e.g., implemented in
Senegal and Mauritania).
- By raising minimum business licence fees (e.g., implemented in Niger).
Efforts to reduce tax evasion should continue. This can be done by higher
penalties and better administration. Penalties can generally be increased without
any pecuniary costs to the government (Gordon, 1990). Better administration, on
the other hand, normally requires additional spending both on salaries, equipment
and facilities. Therefore, such considerations may make it tempting to fight against
evasion with higher penalties rather than with better administration.
There are, however, several problems with this approach. First, when penalties are
too high, often they are not applied. Second, even if the pecuniary costs to the
government may be low or zero, there are other costs (political and social)
associated with high penalties that cannot be ignored. Thus, the best policy is one
that accompanies reasonable penalties with better administration through
improvement of assessment and collection procedures, registration of taxpayers,
use of computers, better audits, etc..
One factor that has tended to reduce revenue from customs duties and created
profound distortions in the resource allocation mechanism of the market system,
is the tax exemption on transactions associated with foreign development
assistance. In addition to exemptions granted the donor agencies, these exemptions
often include foreign companies engaged by the donors (e.g. construction
companies). This has contributed in eroding the tax base not only for import
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duties, but also for company and personal income taxes and taxes on domestic
transactions. Tax exemptions on donor fund ed imports have similar distortionary
effects as the tax-free status of government imports which has provided an
incentive to leak into 'the domesticmarket construction materials and capital
equipment, which exceeded project requirements. The import and capital intensive
technologies characterizing many donor funded projects are indications of the
distortions created by the tax free status. Anecdotal evidence also indicates that
foreign companies have ousted local companies through this kind of unfair
competition.
The Government should therefore consider imposing tax on imports of goods to
bilateral and multilateral funded projects. At least two African countries (Senegal
and Togo) have taken steps to eliminate tax exemptions related to bilateral and
multilateral assistance by fully taxing capital imports financed from abroad and
crediting donor accounts for the taxes paid (IMF, 1992). While these procedures
do not directly add any revenue to the budget, it introduces a system of controls
that may reduce fraud, and thereby contribute to raise government revenues in the
sector. It may further improve both budgetary transparency and resource allocation
by fully accounting for public investment costs. It may also contribute to a more
fair competition between local and foreign companies competing for donor
contracts.
The tax administration that exist in Tanzania today will most likely be inadequate
to cope with the reform proposals outlined above. The Government should
therefore consider increasing expenditures on improving tax administration, even
in the face of overall tight budget situations. The statutory changes should be as
simple as possible. The more complex these changes are, and the more objectives
the policymakers try to promote through the tax system, the more likely it wil be
that the tax administration wil prove to be inadequate to cope with them (Tanzi,
1991). This is an area where so far progress has been very slow, but it is the area
which wil largely determine whether the transformation of the Tanzanian tax
system wil be successful.
Revenue projections implicit in the Rolling Plan and Forward Budget (RPFB)
seem, in general, to be unrealistically high, in which case other variables must be
adjusted, and rendered consistent with a feasible revenue budget. The experiences
from fiscal year 1992/93 show that caution needs to be exercised in setting tax
revenue targets, and that substantial increases in tax revenue generally take time.
In the tax reform process at least one clear tendency therefore needs to be
addressed:
The tendency to be overly optimistic in setting targets on the likely revenue impact from
changes in tax policy and tax administration.
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A generallesson from tax reforms is that reformers should as a rule be risk averse
(Bird, 1983 and 1992). This suggests the importance of fiscal diversification. It
further implies that the recommended changes should be considered carefully to
en sure that their full introduction wil not damage revenue yields severely or
produce unexpected (and undesirable) distortions and inequities. This counsel of
caution means that considerable thought and effort have to be devoted to
institutionalizing and implementing even the most desirable reforms before serious
- and in the worst cases, irreversible - mistakes are made. An essential element in
ameaningful tax reform is thus a careful, detailed, and realistic study of the limits
and potentials of the institutional and administrative system that is expected to
implement and enforce the tax reforms.
The points made above may sound obvious, but only too frequently there is
limited consistency in the overall plan in many developing countries (Mus grave,
1987). One reason is that the Ministry of Finance typically deals with tax policy
and current expenditures, whereas capital expenditures (investments) and general
planning are part of the planning mini stry (or National Planning Commission).
Tanzania is no exception in this respect. With inadequate communication between
the two ministries, it is problematic to ensure consistency of individual tax
changes with the overall objectives of tax reform (Bird, 1992; and Fjeldstad,
1995a).
The discussion in this paper reinforces the arguments with respect to the
importance of improving the quantitative analysis of revenue policy, and taking
more specific and focused measures to improve tax administration. These problems
also reinforce the need for a rigorous quantitative analysis of revenue policy
measures, to be used as the basis for developing more realistic revenue projections.
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